Public capital, income distribution and growth by Getachew, Y.Y.
  
 
Public capital, income distribution and growth
Citation for published version (APA):
Getachew, Y. Y. (2008). Public capital, income distribution and growth. (UNU-MERIT Working Papers; No.
056). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social Research and Training Centre on
Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2008
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
#2008-056
Public Capital, Income Distribution and Growth*
Yoseph Yilma Getachew
Working Paper Series
United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology
 Keizer Karelplein 19,  6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands
Tel: (31) (43) 388 4400, Fax: (31) (43) 388 4499, e-mail: info@merit.unu.edu, URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu

Public Capital, Income Distribution and Growth *
Yoseph Yilma Getachew
UNU-MERIT, Maastricht University, The Netherlands
Abstract
Public capital investment plays an important role in long run growth through enhancing productivity 
and complementing the accumulation of private inputs. Under appropriate conditions, public capital 
could also have important implications for income distribution dynamics. When the credit market is 
imperfect and there are diminishing returns to private factors, income inequality is negatively related 
to economic growth. The dynamics of income distribution is determined by relative income shares of 
private input, wherever initial endowment differs among individuals. Therefore, if the provision of 
public capital has an effect on relative income shares of private inputs, then it will have an effect on 
income distribution dynamics. In this case, public capital once more becomes an important 
determinant of long-run growth through its indirect effect on income distribution. The paper studies 
this and other interesting issues with respect to public capital, income inequality and economic growth.
Key words: Income distribution, Public capital, economic Growth
JEL codes: D31, H54, O41
UNU-MERIT Working Papers
ISSN 1871-9872
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology, 
UNU-MERIT
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of research 
carried out at the Centre to stimulate discussion on the issues raised.
*I am highly grateful to Thomas Ziesemer for series of useful comments. I am also grateful to UNU-MERIT and 
UNU-WIDER for institutional and financial support and Abbi Kedir for helpful comments, Adam Swallow for 
various assistance.

1 Introduction
Public capital, especially infrastructure, plays an important role in long
run growth through enhancing productivity and complementing the ac-
cumulation of private inputs. Under appropriate conditions, public cap-
ital could also have important implications for income distribution dy-
namics. The evolution of income distribution is determined by rela-
tive income shares of private inputs, wherever initial endowment di¤ers
among individuals. Thus, if provision of public capital could have an
impact on relative income shares of private inputs, then it would have
impact on income distribution dynamics. When the credit market is
imperfect (or the input market is missing) and there are diminishing
returns to private factors, income inequality is negatively related to eco-
nomic growth. In this case, public capital once more becomes an im-
portant determinant of long-run growth through its indirect e¤ect on
income distribution.
The main aim of this paper is to develop a joint theory of income in-
equality, public capital and economic growth. Thus, a two-sector model,
with two public capitals, is developed, which analytically captures the
possible interactions among the public inputs (and their associated con-
gestion costs), income inequality dynamics, and growth, within an im-
perfect credit market scenario and using simple Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions. As a prelude to the actual model, the next few para-
graphs lay out the basic idea and intuition behind the new theory in the
simplest possible setup.
Assume an economy where agents are heterogenous in terms of their
initial wealth (human capital) but similar otherwise. If there is no trade
in factor inputs (or, in other words, if access to credit is limited), in-
vestment opportunities depend on individualsinitial level of wealth. If
production function faces diminishing returns to factor inputs, relatively
poor individuals, who have relatively lower investment opportunities,
would have high marginal productivity in production. This means ini-
tial wealth distribution also determines aggregate output that would be
produced in this economy. Therefore, ceteris paribus, the more egalitar-
ian (initial) wealth distribution is, the higher the aggregate production
would be.
To be clear, consider a simple production function y = Ah, where
y and h are output and factor input (say human capital), respectively.1
When 0 <  < 1, the production function faces diminishing return to
h. To simplify aggregation, assume human capital is distributed log-
1In all the text, small and capital letters represent individual and aggregate (av-
erage) variables, respectively.
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normally, i.e., lnh~N(, 2), and initially di¤ers among individuals.
Aggregate output is thus Y = E[y] = AE[h] = AH exp 
2
2
(   1).2
Therefore, aggregate output is lower, when production function has a
diminishing return (0 <  < 1), for a greater income inequality level
(denoted by a greater 2). In this case, the highest output (AH) is
achieved by a society which is perfectly egalitarian (2 = 0).3 The
intuition behind this result is that for a given average initial wealth,
higher income inequality means more productive investment opportu-
nities, which o¤er relatively higher return, would be forgone by poor
households. Now, what would happen to income distribution in this
economy through time? What determines income distribution dynam-
ics?
Simply, income distribution evolves according to relative private fac-
tor income shares. When there are di¤erences in initial endowment
among households who are similar otherwise, the dynamics of income
distributions depends on the degree to which households are able to
exploit their relative initial advantages. The existence of any other com-
plementary inputs in production have no e¤ect on income distribution
dynamics unless they alter relative factor income shares.
For instance, consider an economy similar to as described above,
but now production has taken place with two complementary inputs,
yt = A (ht)
 (Xt)
. Xt can be any complementary input in production
(e.g., inelastic labour or public investment) but similar among individ-
uals. Then, saving becomes ht+1 = syt = sA (ht)
 (Xt)
, where s is
exogenous saving rate. Income distribution is given by, a long story cut
short, var(lnht+1) = 2t+1 = 
22t . Therefore, what matters for income
distribution dynamics is only the relative factor income share of the
private input .4
By the same token, if the provision of public capital as an addi-
tional input in production could a¤ect private factor income shares, and
there is no reason mentioned in the literature why it should not, then
public capital becomes important for income inequality dynamics. This
shall be done rather than by considering public capital as a non-rival,
non-congested input where its service accrues homogeneously among in-
dividual households, but as rival congestible input where its importance
varies among households. In this case, in the absence of a perfect credit
2See Appendix A for the aggregation.
3Y = AH is a production function we see in representative agent models. It can
also be reached, in equilibrium, in heterogenous agent models, with a perfect credit
(or input) market.
4Shown with endogenous saving later in the paper.
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market, public capital could relax resource constraints of the poor, and
brings a disproportional positive impact on the income of the poor, which
in turn goes to reducing income inequality.
All these e¤ects can be captured with a simple modication of our
modelling of public capital on production function. For instance, once
more, assume production takes place using private input ht and public
capital stock Xt. However, assume this time that not the whole public
good Xt but a privately equivalent service of it xt is used in individual
householdsproduction function. And, if production is yt = A (ht)
 (xt)

where xt  Xt(ht) , then by substituting the latter on the production func-
tion, we obtain yt = A (ht)
  (Xt)
 : The income distribution dynamics
for this economy then becomes 2t+1 = (   )22t , which is improved
when private factor income share is reduced by . The simple speci-
cation xt  Xt(ht) captures the disproportionate importance of the public
good Xt among households. Moreover, while aggregate, it consists of a
congestion cost.
The above discussion demonstrates how to extend imperfect credit
market theories in inequality and growth to public capital, inequality and
growth, using the simplest possible setup. The next section presents the
actual model, which, indeed, comprises many other interesting issues, in
a more formal way. In the model we thus suppose an economy, populated
by heterogenous agents, consists of two production sectors: human cap-
ital accumulation and goods production sector. In the former, human
capital is generated using inputs from public and private resources while
production technology is characterized by inter-generational spillover.
Production in the goods sector takes place also using private and public
inputs. The public inputs in both sectors are subjected to congestion.
Moreover, the benet accrues from using the public inputs is di¤erent
among households. That is, relatively higher service from public capital
is perceived by the poor than that of the rich households.
Within such setups, and using simple Cobb-Douglas (CD) produc-
tion functions in both sectors, we show that the provision of public
capital not only promotes growth but also improves income distribution
dynamics. That is, the dynamics of income inequality not only depends
on the magnitude of the elasticity of private inputs but also public in-
puts. The greater the elasticities of the public factors, the faster income
inequality declines. Whereas income inequality is negatively related to
economic growth, public capital thus helps to mitigate this e¤ect. On
the other hand, congestion costs related to the public factors in both
sectors interact with inequality to hamper individual householdscapi-
tal accumulation and goods production.
With respect to economic growth and public capital, some of the re-
3
sults show that growth is nonlinear with public spending in both the
goods production and human capital accumulation sectors. Growth
maximizing tax for public capital in human capital accumulation sec-
tor is equal to public capital elasticity in that sector times the output
elasticity of human capital in the goods production sector, whereas the
optimal tax (growth maximizing tax) for public spending in the goods
production sector is equal to the public capital elasticity of output in
the sector. However, this Barro-type result holds only when there is
no inter-generational spillover on human capital accumulation. When
inter-generational spillover on human capital accumulation prevails, the
optimal tax for the public good in the goods production sector decreases
at the elasticity of human capital in the human capital accumulation
sector (the spillover parameter).
Moreover, congestion factors in both sectors play an important role
in determining optimal taxes in the sectors. For instance, congestion
factor in human capital accumulation sector lowers the optimal tax in
its sector but raises the optimal tax on the goods production sector. But
congestion cost related to the public capital in the goods production
sector lowers the optimal tax in the human capital accumulation sector
while it has no e¤ect on the optimal tax in its own sector.
The study relates to three main strands of literature, which we extend
along various dimensions. First, it relates to the large volume of litera-
ture dedicated to studying the relationship between public capital and
economic growth. These studies investigate the e¤ect of public capital
on economic growth both analytically and empirically: conducted on an
analytical level model with public capital as a ow or stock variable. For
instance, Barro (1990), Turnovsky and Fisher (1995), Turnovsky (2000),
Agénor (2005), Park (2006) and Park and Philippopoulos (2003) model
public capital as a ow of public investment, similar to what we are
doing here. By contrast, Futagami, Morita and Shibata (1993), Cassou
and Lansing (1998), Rioja (1999), Turnovsky (1997; 2004), and Ziese-
mer (1990; 1995) among others treat public capital as a stock variable
in their model.
This paper contributes to the literature by focusing on the analysis
of two public capitals and economic growth in multiple sectors, simul-
taneously. Modelling two public factors at the same time in multiple
sectors is not a bad idea. Public expenditure on primary schooling, basic
research and health, which are important for accumulation of individu-
alshuman capital, essentially coexists with other infrastructure services
such as roads, airports and energy, which are primarily crucial for the
production of rms. However, what is more important is the outcome
arising from the interaction of the determinants of the macro-variables
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within the sectors. Some of these are mentioned above: Congestion cost
in a sector determines the magnitude of optimal tax in another sector.
Inter-generational spillover in a sector have e¤ect on the level of growth
maximizing taxes on another sector. Moreover, inequality interacts with
congestion factors to determine individual householdscapital accumu-
lation and good production.
With the exception of Agénor (2005; 2008)?, the literature has mainly
restricted public capital to be an input in only a single sector, either in
the goods production or human capital accumulation sector.5 For in-
stance, Ziesemer (1990; 1995) model public capital as a factor which
complements private human capital accumulation, while Barro (1990),
Cassou and Lansing (1998), Park (2006) and Park and Philippopou-
los (2003) among others use public spending as an input on the nal
goods sector. Similar to Agénor we model public capital as an input in
both the nal goods production and human capital accumulation sectors.
However, unlike Agénor, we model the public factors in a heterogenous
environment, and apply Lucas-type human capital production function,
thus we are also able to analyse their implication for income distribution.
Second, the paper is related to literature that studies the relation-
ship between public capital and income inequality. Recently, a growing
number of empirical studies try to assess the impact of infrastructure on
income inequality. For instance, Calderón and Serven (2004)?, Calderón
and Chong (2004) and Lopez (2004) nd that infrastructure reduces in-
come inequality and enhances economic growth at the same time. World
Bank (2003) and Estache (2003) argue infrastructure has a positive dis-
proportionate impact on growth. OECD (2006) reports that "infrastruc-
ture is important for pro-poor growth".
However, few attempt to study their relationship analytically. Fer-
reira (1995) analysed it in a model with quite a complex setup where
the accessibility of higher production activity requires minimum lumpy
investment and hence, if the credit market is missing, depends solely
on initial wealth distribution. A steady-state distribution is derived
with three social classes: lower class workers, middle-class and upper-
class entrepreneurs. The provision of public investment below some level
might make the "government dependable" middle-class disappear, the
argument goes, creating less equality of opportunity, as well as lower
growth. The present paper is the rst attempt to analytically capture
the relationship between public capital and income inequality using a
simple production function such as CD, but not, of course, without a
5Although Rioja (2005) also studies two public capitals in education and goods
sector, he does not provide an analytical solution. Rather, he calibrates it to the
Latin America data to solve it quantitatively.
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constraint. The analytical tractability of CD comes with a cost of strin-
gent restriction on relative factor shares, which makes the production
function inconvenient for distribution analysis.6
The third strand of literature related to the present study deals
with the dynamics of income inequality and long-run growth within
an imperfect credit market scenario (e.g. Loury (1981), Galor and
Zeira (1993), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Piketty (1997), Aghion and
Bolton (1997), Aghion and Howit (1998), Aghion, Caroli, and García-
Peñalosa (1999), and Benabou (1996; 2000; 2002)).7 Our study comple-
ments their ndings. For instance, Benabou (2000; 2002) showed, in his
way of studying the e¤ect of redistributive tax on income inequality and
growth, that private factor income shares and family wealth determine
income distribution dynamics and growth. We show here that public
capital could also be an important determinant of income inequality
dynamics.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
the model. Section 3 is all about income distribution and public capital.
Various macroeconomic aggregates that arise in the model and their
dynamic behaviours are studied in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Households and rms
There is a continuum of heterogenous households, i 2 [0; 1]. Each house-
hold i consists of an adult of generation t and a child of generation t+1.
At the beginning, each adult of the initial generation is endowed with
human capital h0 and a public infrastructure G0 which is shared among
others. The distribution of income is assumed to take, initially, a known
probability distribution of  0(:). Thus, the initial distribution is given
and evolves over time at equilibrium.
Agents care about their consumption level and the human capital
stock of their children. When young, they accumulate human capital
using both private and public input. When adult, they use their human
capital for nal goods production. Government tax income with two
xed at rate taxes,  and  , in order to nance the public inputs,
denoted by Gt and Mt, in the goods production and human capital
accumulation sectors, respectively. Individuals allocate after tax income
between current consumption ct and children education et, while the
6In CD, relative factor income shares are xed (constant) due to the constancy of
elasticity of substitutions, which is, indeed, equal to one.
7In contrast to the rst and the second strand of literatures, this literature does
not focus on public capital.
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latter represents private investment for human capital accumulation of
the o¤spring. Preferences are logarithmic. Production functions are
Cobb-Douglas.
A utility of an individual is thus dened as
ln ct +  lnht+1 (1)
subject to
ct + et = (1      )yt (2)
where yt is income of an individual.
Human capital accumulation function for the o¤spring ht+1 is a func-
tion of parental human capital ht, private educational investment et, and
public service on the sector mt,
ht+1 = B (ht)
" (mt)
 (et)
 (3)
The public service mt represents a privatly-equivalent public input.
We assume mt to be proportional to the total public expenditure Mt on
the sector, but inversely proportional to the individuals initial wealth
(human capital) ht. That is,
mt =
Mt
(ht)

(4)
where  represents the degree of disproportionate impact of public capi-
tal on an individualshuman capital accumulation. The case  = 0 corre-
sponds to an infrastructure service which is equally important (available)
to each individual. But, the case  > 0 implies a relatively higher ser-
vice from public capital is perceived by poor than that of rich households
during the human capital accumulation process. The latter is supported
by a number of research documentation.
For instance, Ferreira (1995) argues infrastructure services could be
more important for the poor due to their lack of ability to purchase
their private substitute. Particularly when the credit market is imper-
fect, his argument goes, the reduction in public capital increases income
inequality because this hurts the poor who are more dependent on the
public provision of public capital than the rich, who have alternative pri-
vate substitutes. As documented by Brenneman and Kerf (2002), many
microeconomic studies also support this.8
8For instance, Leipziger, Fay and Yepes (2003) nd an increase in water and san-
itation reduces child mortality signicantly. Jacoby (2000) argues that improvement
in communication and road services could result in substantial benets on average,
much of it going to the poor.
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Interesting enough, while aggregating, equation (4) captures conges-
tion cost. In this case,  is called congestion factor, where the benchmark
 = 0 is a case of public capital with no congestion cost.9 However, no-
tice that in (4) public capital would be congested less than it is normally
in representative agent models in the literature sinceZ 1
0
Mt
(ht)

d t(ht) =
Mt
(Ht)

exp
2t
2
 
2 + 

>
Mt
(Ht)

(See Appendix A for the aggregation).
In order to be in line with the literature, and make comparison pos-
sible, we prefer to avoid this e¤ect. We can thus make congestion het-
erogeneity neutral by replacing (4) with
mt =
Mt
(ht)
 exp
2t
2
 
2 + 
 = Mt
(Ht)

(5)
Combining (3) and (5), the human capital accumulation function be-
comes
ht+1 = B (ht)
 (Mt)
 (et)
 exp

 
2
t
2

 


(6)
where 0 < "; ; ;  < 1; 0    ("  ) < 1 and   2 + .
The last term in (6) arises due to the simultaneous e¤ect of disag-
gregation and congestion and, it is the same for all individuals. It does
not exist either in representative agent economy 2t = 0 or heterogenous
economy without congestion cost  = 0. In fact, it explicitly captures the
negative spillover of the inequality-congestion interaction on individual
household human capital accumulation.
2.2 The Firm
We assume each household owns a rm.10 Aggregate output is thus
the sum of individualsproduction. We also assume individuals di¤er
only in their initial human capital while human capital is lognormally
distributed across agents: lnht~N(t; 
2
t ).
Thus, the income of an agent of generation t is
9Traditionally, congestion is modelled in the literature as M ct =
Mt
(Ht)
 , where
 represents the degree of congestion; Ht and Mt is aggregate private capital and
public expenditure, respectively; and hence M ct represents public expenditure with
congestion cost. See also Glomm and Ravikumar (1994).
10This assumption shuts o¤ the input market, or it is another way of assuming
credit market is imperfect.
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yt = A (ht)
 (gt)
 (7)
Once more we dene the public service gt, in the goods production
sector, similar to (5)
gt =
Gt
(ht)
 exp

2t
2
 (2 + )
 (8)
Thus, gt and , in the goods production sector, are counterparts of mt
and , in the human capital accumulation sector, respectively; while
(8) is a counterpart equation of (5), in the human capital accumulation
sector. Therefore, gt represents infrastructure service that is passed to
individual households, and depends on infrastructure stock Gt in the
goods production sector and initial human capital of the agent.
Combining (7) and (8), the production function for the goods pro-
duction becomes
yt = A (ht)
! (Gt)
 exp

 
2
t
2


(9)
where 0 < ; ; ; ! < 1; !  (   ); and   2 + .11 The last
term in (9) has the same interpretation with that of the last term in (6).
Therefore, early on, from (6) and (9), the following proposition can be
established:
Proposition 1 Income inequality bears additional cost to household hu-
man capital accumulation and goods production when coupled with con-
gestion.
While aggregate, production Yt is
Yt = A (Ht)
! (Gt)
 exp

2t
2
(!(!   1)  )

(10)
since E [(ht)
!] = (Ht)
! exp
2t
2
! (!   1) (see appendix A); Ht is the ag-
gregate (average) human capital.
According to (10), aggregate income is smaller in heterogenous economies
than representative ones 2t = 0.
11The case  =  is not included since it is unlikely that goods would be produced
using only public capital. As a matter of fact, roads do not produce by themselves.
9
2.3 Government
We assume government budget is at all times balanced:
Igt 
Z 1
0
yt d t(ht) = Yt (11)
Mt
Z 1
0
ytd t(ht) = Yt (12)
Thus, government collects proportional taxes  and  on output Yt , to
nance public expenditure Igt andMt in the goods production and human
capital accumulation sectors, respectively, while the accumulation of the
public capital in the goods production sector follows the rule
Gt+1 = I
g
t +Gt(1  g) (13)
where Gt and 
g denote the public capital stock and depreciation in the
goods production sector, respectively.
2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
According to the above descriptions, an individual of period t solves the
following problem, which is derived by substituting (2) and (6) into (1),
Max
et
ln ((1      ) yt   et) +  lnB (ht) (Mt) (et) exp

 
2
t
2

 


(14)
taking as given,  ,  , Mt, I
g
t and Gt.
The rst order condition gives
et = a(1      )yt (15)
where a = 
1+
; (15) shows the agents optimal saving as the function of
her income. Notice that the saving rate is identical among individuals,
due to logarithmic preferences, although rate of return on investment is
di¤erent.12
To derive the individualshuman capital accumulation equation, which
is associated to their optimal behavior, substitute (15) and (12) into (6),
then use (9), to get
12In logarithmic utility function, inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is one,
and consequently income e¤ect exactly compensates substitution e¤ect (See De La
Croix and Michel 2002: pp. 13-14). In this case, individualssaving rate is indepen-
dent of the rate of return.
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ht+1 = B (ht)
 (Yt)


a(1      )A (ht)! (Gt)

exp

 
2
t
2
 
+ 

Then, by substituting (10) into the above equation, we get the fol-
lowing di¤erence equation,
ht+1=B (ht)


A (Ht)
! (Gt)
 
 
a(1      )A (ht)! (Gt)

exp

2t
2
    + + !(!   1)  
=BA+ (ht)
+! (Gt)
(+) (Ht)
!
(a(1      )) exp

2t
2
 
!(!   1)  ( + )   (16)
According to (16), an individuals human capital accumulation is de-
termined by human capital of his parent ht, initial income distribution
2t , aggregate public and private capital stock, Ht and Gt, in the econ-
omy, respectively. The negative e¤ect of income inequality in individual
household human capital production could not be a surprise. In fact, in
the model, household human capital accumulation is a function of the
provision of public capital Mt, which depends on the level of aggregate
income Yt. But Yt has, in turn, a negative relationship with income
inequality 2t due to credit market imperfection and the existence of
diminishing returns to factors.
3 Income Distribution and Public Capital
From (16), we derive the following two di¤erence equations, which char-
acterize the evolution of capital accumulation and income distribution
in the economy13
t+1E [lnht+1] = ( + !( + ))t + ( + ) lnA
+ lnB + ( + ) lnGt +  ln  +  ln a(1      )
+
2t
2
 
!2   ( + )   (16)
2t+1 var [lnht+1] = ( + !)2 2t  ("   + (  ))2 2t (17)
13We use the fact that E [lnht] = lnHt   
2
t
2 in deriving (16) (see Appendix A).
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Since the distribution  t(ht) is lognormal, and hence its log distrib-
ution is normal, the log distribution of  t+1(ht+1) is normal.
Equation (17) has a solution, 2t = ( + !)
2t 20. Thus, steady state
income distribution 2 takes a value of the initial distribution 20, 0 or
1, depending on some conditions,
2 = 0 if  + ! < 1 (18)
2 = 20 if  + ! = 1 (19)
2!1 if  + ! > 1 (20)
Therefore, income inequality will decline through time and ultimately
vanish for certain values on the parameters,  + ! < 1. The reason
for the vanishing is that the heterogeneity, in this model, is only on
individualsinitial wealth; agents are similar otherwise, in their ability,
technology, etc. Thus, a diminishing return on net private accumulative
factors, +! < 1, implies resource poor households are more productive
than rich ones; consequently, it is inevitable for the poor to catch up with
the rich in the long run.14 Therefore, the model captures the possible role
of public capital, and also family wealth on income inequality dynamics,
in the short run. Particularly, (16) and (17) capture the intuition that
di¤erences in family wealth and the existence of public capital as an input
for the production of goods and accumulation of human capital play
important (but opposite) role in the persistence of income inequality.
That is,
Proposition 2 The existence of public factors in the goods production
and human capital function, as rival congestible inputs, with a dispropor-
tionate impact on individual households, speeds up income distribution
convergence, in the short run.
Family wealth, similar to what is found by Benabou (2000; 2002),
exasperates income inequality. More important is the parents wealth,
i.e., the larger is ", for the accumulation of the o¤springs human cap-
ital, the more income inequality persists. But, more important are the
public capitals for the accumulation of human capital and production of
goods, that is, the greater are  and , also the larger their dispropor-
tionate impact on income, i.e., the greater are  and , the faster income
inequality declines.
14See also Saint-Paul, G., and T. Verdier (1993) for a model where inequality
dynamics is speeded up through public intervention.
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How large is the magnitude of the elasticity of output of public capital
is rather an empirical question. In the past, there were a number of
instances where economists had estimated a signicant large impact of
public capital on output. For instance, Aschauer (1989; 2000) estimated
a public capital output elasticity of 0.39 for the United States and about
0.3 for a set of developing countries. Kocherlakota and Yi (1996) also
estimated with a marginal product of public capital that is well in excess
of private capital. Although some economists think the estimates are too
large to believe, there is more consensus recently among researchers on
the signicant and positive impact of public capital on output.15
To sum up, we have shown here, as we argued in the introductory
section, that the dynamics of income distribution is governed by relative
private input income shares (", , and ). However, under certain con-
ditions, provision of public capitals in the goods production and human
capital accumulation sectors would have a positive role in income distri-
bution dynamics, by altering relative private factor income shares. The
impact of public capital on income inequality dynamics depends on the
degree of its importance to private production, which is reected on the
magnitude of  and . Moreover, whether provision of public capital is
targeted towards the poor, which is also reected on the magnitude of
the parameters  and , is important to income distribution dynamics.
4 Growth, Inequality and Public Factors
4.1 Aggregate Capitals
To determine the remaining macro-variables, rst, aggregate (16) in or-
der to obtain the equation that characterizes the evolution of aggregate
human capital,
Ht+1=BA
+ (Gt)
(+) (Ht)
+(+)! (a(1      ))
exp

2t
2

( + !)( + !   1)  
+!(!   1)  (( + ))

We use the fact thatE
h
(ht)
+!
i
= (Ht)
+! exp

2t
2
( + !)( + !   1)

(see appendix A). By assuming constant returns to scale with respect
to accumulative factors, in both human capital accumulation and the
goods production sectors, i.e.,  +  = 1 and ! +  = 1, respectively, we
can rewrite the above equation as
15See Gramlich (1994), Sturm et al. (1998) and Romp and de Haan (2005; 2007)?
for a detailed survey of this literature.
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Ht+1 = BA
 (Gt)
 (Ht)
+! (a(1      )) 
t (21)
where

t = exp

2t
2
 
( + !)( + !   1) + !(!   1)   + 
Then, we easily derive the dynamic equations for the public capital
in the goods production sector by substituting (11) into (13), using (10),
and assuming a complete depreciation ( g = 1)
Gt+1 =  A (Ht)
! (Gt)
zt (22)
where
zt = exp

2t
2
(!(!   1)  )

Equations (17), (21), and (22) describe the dynamics of the economy.
Therefore, the growth rate of the economy is determined by these equa-
tions. Early on, the negative e¤ect of income inequality on growth can
be deduced from the relationship between income inequality and capital
accumulation. Equations (21) and (22) state income inequality is detri-
mental for accumulation of public and private capital. In (21) and (22),
the terms zt, 
t  1.16 The maximum values zt, 
t = 1 are reached
when 2t = 0. Therefore, cetris paribus, the highest capital accumulation
is realized when the society is perfectly egalitarian 2t = 0.
4.2 Dynamics and Steady State
The value that  ( "  ) assumes is important in determining the
long run behaviour of the system. First of all, recall that ", the e¤ect
of family wealth on human capital accumulation of the o¤spring, and
, the disproportionate e¤ect of the public capital on individual in-
come, have opposite roles on income distribution dynamics. The former
(the greater) makes income inequality persistent whereas the later (the
greater) reduces it through time.17
When  = 0, i.e., the e¤ect of family wealth on human capital ac-
cumulation of the o¤spring is equal to the disproportionate e¤ect of the
16The proof is simple. First, recall the assumptions on the parameters (Section
2.1). Then, it is su¢ cient to assume a diminishing return on net private accumulative
factors ( + !) < 1, for the expressions inside the two large parenthesis in zt and

t to be negative,
2t
2 (:) < 0.
17See (17) and the subsequent discussion in Section 3.
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public capital on income distribution in the sector, the system behaves
in the long run similar to a standard AK model. In steady state, the
ratio H
G
is constant. That is, dividing (21) by (22), when 2 = 0,
H
G
= Ba  1(1      )
Therefore, at equilibrium 2 = 0, the system is characterized by a
continuum of steady state equilibria while each can be reached only if
the system starts at equilibrium. Moreover, aggregate variables will be
in a balanced growth path, where H, G and Y grow at the same rate.18
And, the growth rate of the economy can be analytically determined at
any point in time. However, in the short run, it exhibits transitional dy-
namics, unlike the textbook AK model, which arises from the existence
of income inequality dynamics 20 6= 0 in the model.
When  > 0, there exists a stable and unique global steady state
whereH;G and Y converge, where the steady state is saddle point stable.
However, aggregate variables exhibit imbalance growth. While human
capital grows faster than output, public capital grows at the same rate
with the latter.
Propositions 3 and 5 below are related to the two di¤erent cases,
 = 0 and  > 0, respectively.19 But, rst, in order to characterize the
dynamics, we need to log-linearize the system, (21) and (22), near a local
steady state point (H;G). That is,
(lnHt+1   lnH)= ( + !) (lnHt   lnH) +  (lnGt   lnG)
+(ln2t   ln2) ln
 (23)
(lnGt+1   lnG)=! (lnHt   lnH) +  (lnGt   lnG)
+
 
ln2t   ln2

lnz (24)
If we consider only equilibrium values of the income distribution
which only exist, 2 = 20 or 
2 = 0 (see (18)-(20)), then we will have
(ln2t   ln2)2 = 0. Thus, (23) and (24) will be simplied to
(lnHt+1   lnH)= ( + !) (lnHt   lnH) +  (lnGt   lnG) (25)
(lnGt+1   lnG)=! (lnHt   lnH) +  (lnGt   lnG) (26)
In matrix form, (25) and (26) become
18The variables without time subscript (H, G, Y and 2) denote steady state
values.
19We exclude the case  < 0 because of its unlikeliness.
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
lnHt+1   lnH
lnGt+1   lnG

=

( + !) 
! 
 
lnHt   lnH
lnGt   lnG

(27)
A =

( + !) 
! 

(28)
where A is the Jacobian matrix.
In regard to the dynamic behaviour of the economy, for the case
 = 0, we make the following proposition:
Proposition 3 For  = 0 (or " = ), the system is non-hyperbolic,
i.e., one of the characteristic roots is a unit.
Proof. The characteristic polynomial P () for the linear system is given
by (25) and (26), recall our earlier assumption ! +  = 1,
P ()=2   Tr(A)+Det(A)
=2   ( + 1)+  (29)
Since  = 0, then 2    = 0 and hence 1 = 1.
In this case, we can analytically derive the (AK type) growth rate
t at any point in time (see Appendix B for the derivation),
t+1 = ! ln+ ! ln (1      ) + ! ln  +  ln + t +t (30)
where
t =  !
2
t
2
 
 + 2!

< 0
t = !
3
2
t
2
(!   1) < 0
 = BaA
1
!
According to (30), both taxes  and  and income distribution vari-
able 2t are important for the economys growth rate t. The terms
t and t capture the extent to which income inequality hampers eco-
nomic growth during transition. While t represents the negative e¤ect
of inequality-congestion interaction on economic growth,20 t captures
the pure e¤ect of income inequality on a heterogenous economy with
a production function that exhibits diminishing returns to factors, and
20See proposition 2, and equations (6) and (9).
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where there exists imperfect credit market. Whereas, the public capital
is shown here mitigating this e¤ect.21
Notice, if t = 0 and t = 0, i.e., 2t = 0, then growth rate of output
 > 0. But, for greater t and t (due to greater 2t ), the growth rate
of output could be zero and even negative.
The relationship between the taxes used to nance the public capitals
and long run growth is non-linear, in line with the literature. The growth
maximizing taxes ( gmax and  gmax), for the case  = 0, are derived by
@
@ 
=

 
  (1  )
1      = 0
) = (1  )
 + (1  )
@
@
=
(1  )

  (1  )
1      = 0
)  = (1   )
Recall the assumption on constant returns to scale on accumulative fac-
tors  +  = 1 and ! +  = 1. Combining the above two, we obtain
 gmax=  (31)
 gmax= !( (  )) (32)
The optimal tax for public capital in the goods production sector
 gmax is equal to the share of public capital in the sector, similar to
that found by Barro (1990) and others, while the growth maximizing
tax for public capital in the human capital accumulation sector  gmax
is equal to the share of the public capital in that sector times the net
output elasticity of human capital. From the latter and (32), we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Congestion cost  related to public capital in the goods
production sector lowers growth maximizing tax  gmax for the public cap-
ital in the human capital accumulation sector, through decreasing the
human capital elasticity of output.
The tax used to nance the public factor in human capital accumu-
lation sector  a¤ects growth via its positive role in the accumulation of
human capital, which in turn will be used for output production. How-
ever, human capital, in the model, has the side e¤ect of congesting the
21Recall that ! = 1  , where  is the elasticity of output of the public capital.
17
public capital in the goods production sector. This leads to a negative
relationship between the congestion factor on infrastructure in the goods
production sector  and its growth maximizing tax in the sector  gmax.
With regard to the dynamic behaviour of the economy for the case
 > 0, the following proposition is established:
Proposition 5 For  > 0, the characteristic polynomial of the log-
linearized system admits two positive roots, where only one root is stable.
Given G0 and H0, there exists a unique solution to (25) and (26), which
converges to (H;G). The path is monotonic and the steady state is sad-
dle point stable.
Proof. The characteristic polynomial for the Jacobian matrix of the
linear system is given by (29)
P () = 2   ( + 1)+ 
Generally, when j1 +Det(A)j < jTr(A)j, the steady state equilibrium is
a saddle; there is one and only one real root which belongs to ( 1; 1).22
But, we have j1 + j < j1 + j. Moreover, since the product of the roots,
which is equal to the determinant of the Jacobian matrix (12 = ), is
positive, both roots have the same sign and hence positive. Therefore,
the characteristic roots are positive, real and only one root is within a
unit circle, (0 < 1 < 1). Thus, given G0 and H0 (since both Gt and
Ht are predetermined variables), the trajectory of the dynamic system
is uniquely, locally, determined. The global analysis is established below
using phase diagrams (Figures 1 & 2).
The graphical analysis can be done near the set of points where
2t = 0, for  6= 0. Thus, from (21) and (22) we have
Ht+1=BA (Ht)
+! (Gt)
 (a(1      ))  (33)
Gt+1= A (Ht)
! (Gt)
 (34)
To build the phase diagram, rst we need to characterize the set of points
where there is no change on the variables, for (33) and (34). That is, for
(33) we solve Ht+1 = Ht for Gt and for (34) we solve Gt+1 = Gt for Ht,
to get
Gt=(BA (a(1      )) )
1
 (Ht)
 
 (35)
Ht=( A)
 1
!
(Gt)
1 
! = ( A)
 1
!
Gt (36)
22See De la Croix and Michel (2002), A.3.4.
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l
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tH
tG
Figure 1: Phase diagram for a case  >  or 0 <  

< 1. Together with
the eigenvalues the steady state is globally stable.
The slope of the phase line (35) depends on the relative values of
 and . If  > , then 0 <  

< 1 and hence Gt is increasing at
a decreasing rate in Ht, in space (Ht; Gt) (Figure 1). If  < , then
 

< 0, and Gt is decreasing at an increasing rate in Ht (Figure 2).
The curve (36) is easy to characterize. The phase line is a diagonal line,
with slope ( A) 
1
! .
By combining (35) into (36), we obtain the equilibrium values where
the two phase lines meet
G=(BA (a(1      )) ) 1 ( A)  ! (37)
H =(BA (a(1      )) ) 1 ( A)
 
!
(38)
Figures 1 and 2 capture the qualitative feature of the model. Notice
that although the slopes of the phase lines for Ht are di¤erent for the
two cases, ( <  and  > ), the steady state equilibrium loci Z remain
the same. Moreover, the saddle path has a negative slope.
Once again by using the log-linearized system, we can characterize
19
Zd
'l
S
tH
tG
Figure 2: Phase diagram for a case  <  or  

< 0. The result is the
same with that of Fig. 1 except here the phase line for equation (35) is
downward slopping.
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the growth maximizing tax rates ( gmax and 

gmax), for the case  > 0,
near the steady state. The economys growth rate near the steady state
is dened,  = lnYt   lnY ,
 = ! (lnHt   lnH) +  (lnGt   lnG) (39)
Combining (26) and (39), we obtain
 = lnGt+1   lnG (39)
Alternatively, from (25) and (39), we can get
lnHt+1   lnH =  (lnHt   lnH) +  (39)
From (39) and (39), we see that there is an imbalance in the growth
rate of macro-variables when  > 0. While output Yt grows at the same
rate with the public capital Gt, human capitalHt grows faster. To derive
the optimal taxes, we substitute (34) and (37) in (39), to obtain,
 = ln A (Ht)
! (Gt)
   ln (BA (a(1      )) ) 1 ( A)  !
By leaving out the superuous variables and parameters, we can
rewrite the last equation in an equivalent form
max
 ;
 =
(1  )
!
ln   

ln(1      )  

ln 
Thus, the FOC is
@
@ 
=
(1  )
!
1
 
+

(1      ) = 0
Then, solving for  , we get
 =
(1  )(1  )
! + (1  ) (40)
We do the same for the optimal tax in the human capital accumula-
tion sector
@
@
=

(1      )  


= 0
 =(1   ) (41)
Solving (40) and (41) simultaneously we obtain the growth maximizing
tax rate for the public capitals in the goods production sector, for the
case  > 0,
21
 gmax =
(1  )
1  ) (42)
and human capital accumulation sector
 gmax =
!
1  (1  !) (43)
Thus, from (42) and (43), we make our last proposition:
Proposition 6 First, when  = 0, equations (42) and (43) are equiva-
lent to equation (31) and (32). Second, proposition 6 holds for both cases
 = 0 and  > 0. Third, while  gmax is increasing at ( "  ),  gmax
is decreasing at it. Therefore, the congestion factor , of the public good
in human accumulation sector, lowers the optimal tax on the sector but
raises the optimal tax in the goods production sector.
The existence of inter-generational spillover in the human capital
accumulation sector, i.e.,  > 0, increases the role of human capital in
the economy. This is reected by a positive relation between  gmax and
. On the other hand  gmax and  are inversely related when both have
a similar role in the economy. According to Barro and Sala-I-Martin
(1992)?, the tax rate   raises growth since the social rate of return on
investment exceeds the private return, which reects a spillover e¤ect.
5 Conclusion
We studied public spending, in a two-sector economy populated with
heterogenous agents, as a factor that both enhances productivity and
promotes accumulation of human capital. We showed that public in-
vestment in both human capital accumulation and the goods production
sectors have a net positive e¤ect on long run growth. We documented
the possible e¤ects of congestion cost related to a public capital in a
given sector on the magnitude of the optimal tax in its own sector as
well as in the other sector. We also showed that the magnitudes of opti-
mal taxes on both sectors depend on whether there is inter-generational
spillover in the human capital accumulation sector. Moreover, we dis-
closed inequality-congestion interaction and the consequent damage on
individual householdsproduction and accumulation of capital. We were
also able to capture the negative e¤ect of income inequality on economic
growth.
More importantly, we showed infrastructure development in both
sectors could improve income inequality dynamics, and hence could pro-
mote economic growth, once more, through an indirect e¤ect of miti-
gating the negative inuence of income inequality on economic growth.
22
Therefore, in line with recent empirical ndings (Calderón and Serven
2004?, Calderón and Chong 2004, Lopez 2004, amongst many), we con-
clude that under appropriate conditions, infrastructure could promote
pro-poor growth (i.e., loosely dened as an increase in growth and re-
duction in income inequality). In particular, with public investment,
especially infrastructure, which targets the poor (or, at least, which is
accessible to the poor), not only would the economic pie grow but also
a larger slice would pass to the poor. That makes a wise investment
on productive public good an area that belongs to the win-win type of
policies.
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Appendices
A Aggregation
The logarithm of a variable with lognormal distribution will have a nor-
mal distribution (and vice versa). A normal distribution preserves under
linear transformation (Greene 2003, appendix B).? We use these facts
and other important relations between lognormal and normal distribu-
tion to study the evolution of income distribution in our model.
Since we assume a lognormal distribution for individuals initial hu-
man capital, i.e., lnht~N(t; 
2
t ), we have the following relation
lnE[ht] = E[lnht] +
2t
2
()E[lnht] = lnE[ht]  
2
t
2
 lnHt   
2
t
2
(A1)
since E(ht)  Ht
We derive E [(ht)
!] = (Ht)
! exp

2t
2
! (!   1)

, for instance, in equa-
tion (10), using the above facts. If ht is a lognormal distribution then
(ht)
! is also a lognormal distribution, thus, according to (A1),
lnE[(ht)
!] =E[ln (ht)
!] +
1
2
var[ln (ht)
!]
=E[! lnht] +
1
2
var[! lnht]
=!

lnHt   
2
t
2

+ !2
2t
2
=! lnHt + ! (!   1) 
2
t
2
(A2)
E[(ht)
!] = (Ht)
! exp

2t
2
! (!   1)

(A3)
To derive E
h
(ht)
+!
i
= (Ht)
+! exp

2t
2
( + !)( + !   1)

for
equation (21) follow similar steps as above.
B The Growth Rate
For the case  = 0, growth rate t can be derived as follows. Since
t+1 = lnYt+1   lnYt (B1)
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From (10) and (B1), we have
t+1=! (lnHt+1   lnHt) +  (lnGt+1   lnGt)
+
 
2t+1   2t

2
(!(!   1)  ) (B2)
By substituting (21) and (22), and using (17), in (B2), we obtain
t+1=!
 
lnBA (Ht)
! (Gt)
 (a(1      ))
exp

2t
2
 
!(!   1) + !(!   1)  ( +   lnHt
!
+

ln A (Ht)
! (Gt)
 exp

2t
2
(!(!   1)  )

  lnGt

+
2t
2
(!(!   1)  )  (!)2   1
Alternatively,
t+1=! lnBA
 (Ht)
! 1 (Gt)
 (a(1      ))
+ ln A (Ht)
! (Gt)
 1 + !
2t
2
 
!(!   1) + !(!   1)    + 
+
2t
2
(!(!   1)  ) + 
2
t
2
(!(!   1)  )  (!)2   1 (B3)
Then, simplifying (B3), while applying ! +  = 1 and  +  = 1 repeat-
edly, we get equation (30)
t+1 = ! lnBa
A
1
! +! ln (1      )+! ln  +  ln +t+t (30)
where
t=
2t
2
  ( + )!   2    (!)2   1
= !
2
t
2
 
 + 2!

< 0
and
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t=
2t
2
!

!(!   1) + !(!   1)
+(!   1) + (!   1)  (!)2   1

=
2t
2
!

!(!   1) + !(!   1)
+(!   1)  (!)2   !)

=
2t
2
!

!(!   1)+
(!   1)  (!)2 + !   !)

=
2t
2
!2
    !2 + + (!   1) + 
or,
t = !
3
2
t
2
(!   1):
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